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Abstract. Incentive-based enforcement can be an effective mechanism for fos-
tering cooperation in open distributed systems. The strength of such systems is
the absence of a central controlling instance, but at the same time, they do depend
upon (voluntary) regulation to achieve system goals, creating a potential “tragedy
of the commons”. Many different mechanisms have been proposed, both in the
multi-agent systems and the social science communities, to solve the commons
problem by using incentive-based enforcement. This paper advocates the use of
agent-based simulation to carry out detailed comparative analysis of competing
enforcement mechanisms, by providing common settings, the environment and
the basis for comprehensive statistical analysis. To advance this argument, we
take the case study of wireless mobile grids, a future generation mobile phone
concept, to ground our experiments and analyse three different enforcement ap-
proaches: police entities, image information and a well-known existing reputa-
tion mechanism. The contribution of this paper is not the enforcement mecha-
nisms themselves, but their comparison in a common setting through which we
demonstrate by simulation and statistical analysis that enforcement can improve
cooperation and that a relatively small percentage (of the population as a whole)
of police agents outperforms (under the chosen metrics) image- and reputation-
based approaches. Hence, qualified conclusions may be drawn for the application
of such mechanisms generally in open distributed systems.
1 Introduction
Open distributed systems allow autonomous entities with some form of social relation-
ship to join and leave freely as well as to perform actions such as interacting with other
entities. Entities base their decisions and actions on their own goals as well as their
expectations about the system and the behaviour of the other entities. The result of the
combined individual decisions and actions is a global emergent behaviour that—in con-
trast to the individual decision making processes—can be perceived from outside the
system.
The principal advantage and disadvantage of open distributed systems is that at
design-time, it is unknown precisely what individual and collective behaviour may be
exhibited by participating entities. Complete control of even closed distributed systems
has proven a very challenging problem. Rigid control of open systems, especially given
their increasingly pervasive nature, is unrealistic; not only is imposition of controls
a reaction to a perceived threat (to system integrity), it also fails to recognize open
systems as a nascent opportunity.
One particular problem in open distributed systems (be it relay-routing, peer-to-
peer, cloud computing, etc.) is that they require some form of contribution on the part
of participants, which translates into some form of cost to them. Participants can ex-
hibit strategic behaviour and are not necessarily cooperating (i.e. contributing to the
system). For an agent, making resources available therefore has the danger that its good
behaviour is not reciprocated, resulting in no inherent value in cooperation for a par-
ticipant. A lone cooperating user draws no benefit from their cooperation, even if the
rest of the system might. Guaranteed cost paired with uncertainty or even lack of any
resulting benefit does not induce cooperation for a utility-maximizing user. Without any
further incentives, rational users therefore would not cooperate in such an environment
and all will be worse off than if they cooperated. This phenomenon is referred to as the
“Tragedy of the Commons” [14, 19]. As a consequence of the above problem, and of
the limitations on the extent to which rigid control is feasible in open distributed sys-
tems, enforcement mechanisms offer a means to reduce the prevalence of the commons
phenomenon.
To evaluate enforcement mechanisms empirically, as we propose here, in order to be
able to identify which aspects can be quantified and how, a suitable domain is needed.
However this inevitably creates the risk that decisions are made, or metrics are con-
structed that are domain-specific. The domain chosen in this paper is the wireless mo-
bile grid (WMG), which is described in more detail in the next section. We do not
make a judgement as to whether the WMG concept is viable or not: it is simply a novel
example of the kind of emerging ‘digital commons’ that makes it suitable as a case
study for which it would also be useful to get some early indicators of which kinds of
enforcement are effective and what the associated costs might be.
The WMG, as an opportunistic network made possible by chance co-location, ex-
hibits many of the characteristics of an open system: participants are free to join or
leave at any time, identity is not authenticated and free-riding appears to be easy. Con-
sequently, repeat encounters are likely to be few and participant turnover high. Thus,
the participant contributions required to sustain it may be difficult to acquire or to incen-
tivize. The relative complexity of the scenario, at least until better understood, makes
an analytical or game-theoretic approach infeasible at this stage, so we advocate agent-
based simulation as a means to establish a better understanding of the dynamics and
to evaluate side-by-side three well-established enforcement mechanisms. Based on the
common setting provided by the simulation environment we examine the mechanisms’
advantages and disadvantages in respect of one another. For this purpose, in the next
section, we describe the case study, then in Section 3 we present the three enforcement
mechanisms to be compared. The simulation experiments and its results are discussed
in Sections 5 and 6. This paper closes with a short summary of the findings as well as a
discussion of their implications for open distributed systems (Section 7).
2 The Wireless Mobile Grid Case Study
To demonstrate the use of agent-based simulation for the comparative analysis of en-
forcement mechanisms, we start by establishing a common case study for our experi-
ments which portrays the particular features of open distributed systems sketched in the
previous section. In one sense, the domain details of the case study are not especially
important, but are simply there to ground the scenario, rather than using an abstract
scenario which can be harder to assimilate. Thus, the particular domain is the so-called
“wireless mobile grid” (WMG); a mechanism proposed by Fitzek and Katz [10] to ad-
dress the energy issues inherent in 4th generation mobile phones. This paper is not about
the plausibility or otherwise of WMGs, but about the comparative effectiveness of dif-
ferent approaches to enforcement in the context generated by WMGs, representing an
instance of the broader class of open distributed systems.
In WMGs, as well as using the traditional 3G (or LTE) communication link with
base stations, users are envisioned as sharing resources in a peer-to-peer fashion using
a short-link connection protocol such as IEEE802.11 WLAN. The advantage of this
short-link connection is that it uses less power and allows for higher data rates. How-
ever, in order to function properly WMGs require collaboration between users, which
may be difficult to realize. The main problem in WMG is that collaboration comes
at the cost of further battery consumption. In consequence, rational users will prefer
to receive the resources without any commitment to contribute themselves. However,
if a substantial number of users follow this selfish strategy, the WMG will not work
and none will benefit from the potential energy savings arising from cooperation [25].
A WMG is an interesting and novel example of an open distributes system, in which
there are autonomous users with their own goals who can freely join and leave, who
can interact with one another over short-range connections for short periods, and whose
individual actions contribute to the success or failure of the WMG as a whole.
Purely technical (hard-ware or hard-coded) solutions for ensuring non-compliance
in open distributed systems are frequently subverted (see [17] for example). Hence, the
approach we take here, which is to employ enforcement mechanisms such as reputation
information or police agents that regulate WMGs by social means.
3 Enforcement Mechanisms for Wireless Mobile Grids
Many possible enforcement mechanisms exist, so how to choose suitable ones? Balke
and Villatoro [3] provide a systematic overview of possible enforcement options by
identifying the roles actors can have in an enforcement setting and discussing all pos-
sible combinations of these roles in the enforcement process. We do not reproduce the
details of the mechanisms analysed in [3], for sake of space as much as correctness,
but draw on their conclusions to select three mechanisms to concentrate on in more de-
tail: reputation information, image information, also known as direct trust, and police
agents. We choose these because of their popularity in the agent community as much as
for their complementary foundational concepts that allows us to explore a wider range
of options.
3.1 Utilization of Police Entities
The utilization of police entities can be thought of as the implementation of entities
with normative power (e.g. some kind of policing) [15] that participate in the system
(in our example, the WMG) and have permission from the system’s owner to punish, if
detected, negative/inappropriate behaviour (i.e. non-compliance) by means of sanctions.
In contrast to regimentation (i.e. complete control) [7], the police entities do not control
all actions but only act as enforcers when violations are detected. Detection of violations
is done by the police entities themselves, who test the behaviour of entities and react to
what they detect. Several kinds of sanctions can be imagined depending on the severity
of the non-compliance, such as complete exclusion from the WMG or penalty payments
either monetary or in terms of energy.
3.2 Image Information
Image information [18], also called direct trust, is a global or averaged evaluation of
a given agent – usually called the target – on the part of an individual. It consists of
a set of evaluative beliefs about the characteristics of a target. These evaluative beliefs
concern the ability or the possibility of the target to fulfil one or more of the evaluator’s
goals, e.g. to cooperate in a WMG transaction. An image basically gives the evaluator’s
opinion of whether the target is “good” or “bad” or “not so bad” etc. with respect to a
norm, a standard, a skill etc. When utilizing image information, an agent uses its own
information about the past behaviour of the potential interaction partner and makes
decisions based on this information.
3.3 Reputation Information
Reputation information, in contrast to image information, comprises not only agent’
own acquired image information, but that obtained from other agents as well. Thus, rep-
utation in this paper is understood as the process of and the effect of the transmission of
a target’s image. In contrast to image information alone, as described above, when im-
ages are circulated more information becomes available to the individual agents. How-
ever, the circulation of information itself can generate costs. Furthermore it is possible
that agents may circulate false image information to increase their value relative to other
agents.
4 Related Work
Looking at previous works that are of importance for this paper, one can look into two
different directions. The first direction is related work on means of enforcement in open
distributed systems, such a WMGs, whereas the second direction is related work dealing
with the comparison of enforcement mechanisms.
Looking at the first direction, one can identify a large literature in economics and
social sciences on cooperation and free-riding and the mechanisms to overcome the
latter. One of the most well-known analyses is by Ostrom [20], who shows that in small
(relatively closed) communities these “tragedies” can be overcome. Other works use
game theory [4] or evolutionary game theory [12, 13] to address the question. In general,
most of the works looking into enforcement use some form of punishment which serves
as as a deterrent to the rational behaviour of utility-based participants (e.g. [9]). Thus, a
punishment is a fine taken from the the participant’s benefits. The topic has been framed
mostly in terms of mechanism design and the issues that economists have studied more
thoroughly are the information about infraction and sanctions [8], as well as the amount
and pervasiveness of sanctions [6]. As pointed out before methodology often is either
(evolutionary) game-theoretic (see [4] for example) or experimental (including agent-
based simulations) [11, 22].
In the second direction, i.e. the comparative study of enforcement, little related work
can be found. In [5] for example, the authors discuss differences between image and
reputation in detail, however no detailed experiments testing their impact on the same
setting are made. Similar in [22] the authors tests the impact of how far messages are
sent in a network and even considers the costs of these messages, but no comparison
between trust and reputation is made.
5 The Simulation Design
Having briefly outlined the enforcement mechanisms under examination, we now present
the basic simulation setup. We first describe the agents and their decision making be-
haviour and then outline how the enforcement mechanisms have been implemented.
Concerning the technical components of the wireless mobile grid, we adopt the well-
established “flat earth model” [16] that assumes symmetry (i.e. if node A can hear node
B, B can hear A) and an absence of obstacles that might reduce transmission quality.
The flat-earth model is a widely accepted simplification made in the mobile communi-
cations community and has been used for simulation presented in mobile communica-
tion centred articles on this topic (e.g. [2]). Furthermore we assume that all agents have
identical mobile phones, for which we use the energy consumption profile data reported
in [21]. A reason for this assumption is that [21] explains that the Nokia N95 mobile
phone is a representative phone with features for WMG communication and that the
differences between different mobile phones are only marginal.
5.1 The Basic Agent Decision Process
The simulation uses one agent for each user/mobile phone pair. These agents move
randomly in the simulation space and at any given point of time can interact with the
agents that are within their (modelled) WLAN range. The agents make decisions that
maximize their utility under the constraint of bounded rationality. Different agents are
given different utility valuations. We define three kinds of non-police agents according
to the behaviours for which they maximise: (i) “utility agents” that try to minimize
battery consumption and avoid punishment (ii) “honest agents” that cooperate whenever
possible, and (iii) “malicious agents” that try to undermine the system regardless of cost
The agent’s decision-making is based on incomplete knowledge of the system state, so
they can only optimize for local utility, which may be different from the global utility.
Local knowledge is determined by two factors: the agent’s location and its WLAN
radius. A full Cartesian model is unnecessary, since we only need to model proximity,
hence an agent location is modelled as l ∈ R mod 1, that is the interval wraps around.
An agent at  and another at 1− are 2 apart. The proximity of two agents is determined
by each agent’s WLAN radius (rv). An agent at l1 has radius [l1 − rv1, l1 + rv1] and
another at l2 has radius [l2−rv2, l2+rv2]. Communication between these two is possible
if these intervals intersect.
The procedure for the agent’s decision making process and its utility considerations
(see Figure 1) are based on the following issues:
1. Each agent has the task of acquiring a whole file through downloading (over 3G) or
exchanging (over WLAN) file chunks. The agent must decide whether to download
it all or to search for a collaboration partner with whom to share the work. File
size is the first determinant: if the file is small and the potential costs of finding a
collaborator are higher than the potential gains, then the agent will download all
the chunks itself. Otherwise, it looks for nearby agents.
2. If the neighbourhood is sparsely populated, then the chances of finding sufficient
partners is low and the agent downloads all the chunks itself. Otherwise, it sends
a cooperation request specifying the file whose chunks it requires using WLAN
broadcast.
3. If the agent receives a cooperation request for the same file, there is no need to send
a request, so it just replies using WLAN broadcast.
4. Having sent a cooperation request, the agent awaits responses. From the positive
replies, the agent selects collaboration partners, possibly using image or reputation
mechanisms to decide.
5. Once a cooperation group has been formed, an agent has to decide: (i) whether to
download its promised chunk(s) (over 3G) and (ii) whether to share its chunks with
the cooperation group.
6. The cooperation decision depends on the agent’s individual utilities for cooperation
and defection. Thus, an utility agent (see definitions above) compares energy ben-
efits from defecting now, against the future costs arising from detection in terms of
the likelihood and level of a fine, by comparing the number of past defections with
the number and level of past fines.An honest agent will always cooperate and will
never defect. A malicious agent, in contrast, will always defect.
Having made its decision, the last step is to wait and see whether the cooperation
partners send their promised shares. For missing shares, the agent repeats the decision
process outlined above.
5.2 Implementing the Enforcement Mechanisms
We now describe the implementation of the three enforcement mechanisms.
Enforcement Agents An police agent has the same properties as a ordinary agents,
except for restricted behaviour in that it: (i) responds positively to cooperation requests,
if not already committed, and then performs its share of downloading and sharing,
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Fig. 1. Download considerations
(ii) does not have it own file download tasks set at the beginning and (iii) does not
send cooperation requests.
A police agent never defects. Its energy costs count towards the total WMG energy
costs – so that enforcement costs are included. It also monitors cooperation by checking
on the number of defections in the cooperation group to which it belongs and fines those
that have defected. The fine is measured in terms of energy and is set at three times the
agent’s relative gain from defection3.
Enforcers make no distinction between intention and absence of action: it only mat-
ters whether an agent kept the cooperation agreement by sending its chunks by the
cooperation deadline. The same defection may be observed by more than one enforcer,
but the fining mechanism ensures that an agent is not fined twice for the same offence.
Image Information Image information is used by agents in making cooperation de-
cisions. No police agents are used. Image information is information acquired about
another agent through direct interaction with that agent. Thus, the experience of past
interactions is used to evaluate new cooperation requests. If the image is positive, the
collaboration proceeds. Each agent could have an individual defection tolerance level
for all its past collaborators, but to keep the range of experiments within what can be
reported in this paper, this is uniformly set to zero. Thus, the object of a defection will
never collaborate with the defector again. If an agent has no image for the originator of
a cooperation request, it treats the image as positive.
The next step is to incorporate image information in the utility computation. First,
the agent computes the fraction of the number of times its cooperation (request and
offer) was rejected because of its image. This value is then weighted by (i) the chunk
size and (ii) the cooperation group size. The latter is significant because, the larger the
group, the greater the spread of negative image information if the agents defects.
The advantage of image information is its reliability. However, one problem often
associated with image mechanisms is that an agent first needs its own experience to
construct image information. Consequently, it can always be the object of a defection
at least once. Reputation mechanisms are proposed as a way to avoid this problem. We
next explore this approach.
Reputation Information In reputation mechanisms, the image information of indi-
vidual agents is circulated. A large number of reputation mechanisms have been put
forward in the literature covering a range of circumstances. To select one suitable for
WMG, we start by examining the requirements and constraints.
Although the work reported here is simulation-based, in a real WMG, the actual
agents will include humans. This suggests any mechanism should allow for the subjec-
tive expression of trust based on individuals’ perceptions. Additionally, the mechanism
needs to be compatible with the non-numerical and non-monotonic models of human
expression. Finally, the mechanism must be able to handle incorrect information, taking
3 We tested a range of alternative fine levels. Space limits prevent a full report, but the value
of three time’s the gain exhibited the best balance between deterrent and the fine not being
disproportionate to the offence.
the sources of (reputation) information into account and identifying those that provide
false information.
Consequently, we consider three candidate mechanisms: Regret, Fire and Abdul-
Rahman and Hailes (ARH), which are analysed in detail in [23]. Regret seems unsuit-
able because by default it requires a large number of messages to be sent (accounting
for witness, neighbourhood and system reputation) which inevitably increases over-
all energy consumption. Fire is also unsuitable because of its basic assumptions that
agents (i) willingly share their experience and (ii) report truthfully when exchanging
information with one another. This leaves the ARH reputation mechanism [1], which
fortunately satisfies our requirements.
ARH requires that each agent maintains a database of trust relationships that they
use for themselves or to respond to the requests of others. The data is segregated into
direct (image) and indirect (reputation) information. ARH defines a “trust-relationship”
as a vectored connection between exactly two entities, which in some circumstances
can be transitive. In this way they distinguish between direct trust relationships (“Alice
trusts Bob.”) and recommender trust relationships (“Alice trusts Bob’s recommenda-
tions about the trustworthiness of other agents”). This allows entities to account for the
source of reputation information as well as collecting and evaluating information about
the reliability of recommenders. Another interesting contrast to other formalizations is
that, reflecting the qualitative nature of trust, ARH does not use probability values or
the [−1, 1] interval, but a multi-context recording model with abstract trust categories
that are easier for humans to understand. These trust values relate to certain contextual
information (“Alice trusts Bob, concerning “table”-transactions. However, she does not
trust him when it comes to “chair”-transactions.”).
ARH models trust as context-dependent, so it is defined as a “troika” of (agent-
ID, Trust-Category, Trust-Value), with trust categories such as “cooperation partner” or
“recommender”. ARH sets out a recommendation protocol for handling recommenda-
tion requests, statements and enquiries. A recommendation request is forwarded until
one or more agents are found that can give information for the requested category and
which is trusted by the penultimate agent in the chain. We do not support routing in
the WMG simulation and implementing the protocol described above would result in
large amounts of network traffic, impacting significantly upon the potential benefits of
WMG. Thus, we simplify this aspect of ARH in such a way that an agent seeking a
recommendation about a target sends out one broadcast message to its neighbours. If it
receives no answers, the agent does not wait for further information, but as in the case
of image information, cooperates with the target.
An agent, of whichever kind, uses the reputation mechanisms as follows:
1. If it has image or reputation information about the potential cooperation partner, it
uses it.
2. If not, it sends a request for recommendations to its neighbours:
(a) If there are no replies, the agent agrees to collaborate and will update its image
information in due course in respect of the outcome of the collaboration.
(b) If there are one or more replies, they are categorized by source into trusted,
untrusted and unknown:
i. Trusted source: the agent updates its local reputation information using the
most trusted source and acts accordingly (i.e. positive recommendation:
collaborate, negative: not). For equally trusted sources, the first reply is
used.
ii. Untrusted source: the information is kept for later validation but not taken
into account for the current decision.
iii. Unknown source: information is treated as for a trusted source.
Different kinds of agent respond differently to reputation requests. The utility maxi-
mizing agent will not send any information, because answering a message costs energy.
An honest or a malicious agent answers on average one request per interaction event, in
order to limit energy spent on answering reputation requests. An honest agent always
reports truthfully about the target, with the aim of improving the overall information
level in the system. A malicious agent however, if the target is not itself, always gives
negative feedback on the target, with the aim of enhancing its relative reputation.
6 Simulation Setup and Results
6.1 Simulation Setup
As pointed out in the introduction this paper focuses on the use of agent-based simula-
tion to carry out a detailed comparative analysis of competing mechanisms (i.e. enforce-
ment mechanisms in our scenario) and to determine which of these meets the systems
objective (which we defined as energy saving) best. To test the impact of the three dif-
ferent enforcement mechanisms on the cooperation problem and the resulting energy
consumption in WMGs, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The presence of an enforcement mechanisms reduces the average en-
ergy consumption compared to when there is none.
We can assume that an enforcement mechanism has an effect on energy consump-
tion, but if it affects cooperation – and in consequence energy consumption – is this
effect constant across various simulation settings? Specifically, we want to establish
sensitivity across a range of parameters: (i) population size, | A | (ii) population den-
sity (the average number of agents within each others’ WLAN radius), ρneighbourhood,
and (iii) population composition, that is proportions of utility, honest and malicious
agents.
To test the influence of | A | and whether either of the other two parameters affects
the simulation results, we check the null-hypotheses that no difference in simulation re-
sults can be observed when these parameters are varied. We then examine what impacts
upon the different enforcement mechanisms:
Hypothesis 2: The success (in terms of the average energy consumption) of a WMG
using reputation-based enforcement depends on population size, density and com-
position.
Hypothesis 3: The success (measured by average energy consumption) of a WMG
using police agents as the enforcement mechanism depends on population size,
density and composition as well as the number of police agents | AEnf |.
Table 1. Simulation Variables
Name Range/Type Simulation Parameter
Number of Agents (| A |) [2, ∞] 200, 400, 800
Utility Agents as % of | A | [0,100] 0, 25, 50, 75, 100
Malicious Agents as % of | A | [0,100] 0, 25, 50, 75
Honest Agents as % of | A | [0,100] 0, 25, 50, 75
Enforcement Mechanism None, Police Agents, Image Info.,
Reputation Info.
Number of Police Agents | AEnf | as %
of | A |
[0,∞] 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 5 % of | A |, s.t.
| AEnf |> 1
ρneighbourhood [0,| A |-1] 10, 20
Table 2. Analysis of variance of experiments with and without enforcement
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees of
Freedom
Mean
Squares
F Prob > F
(= p-value)
Enforcement 224.759 4 56.1898 1539.94 < 0.0001
Error 709.842 19454 0.0365
Total 934.601 19458
Hypothesis 4: The success (measured by average energy consumption) of a WMG us-
ing image-based enforcement depends on population size, density and composition.
For all of the above, we use the experiment configuration shown in Table 1, which sum-
marizes the factorial experiments performed and the values over which each simulation
parameter ranges.
6.2 Simulation Results
The experiments consist of 50 runs for each of the 468 parameter combinations in Ta-
ble 1, making 23,400 runs in total. We used ANOVA to test the significance relationship
between the independent variables (the parameters in the simulation) and the dependant
variables (the number and ratio of defections and energy consumption)4. We also ap-
plied Tukey’s test as a post-hoc ANOVA, which identifies the impact of specific vari-
ables on the overall result.
Testing Hypothesis 1 We can now analyse the simulation results to test the hypotheses
formulated in the previous section. First, we test hypothesis 1 and look at mean energy
consumption when there are different enforcement mechanisms employed. By means
of ANOVA, we can test whether there is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis
that enforcement mechanisms have no effect on energy consumption. Table 2 shows the
results of this comparison.
4 We performed the Shapiro-Wilk test and Levene’s test to ensure the applicability of ANOVA.
Due to limits on space we do not include details of these results
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Table 3. Post-hoc analysis of variance of enforcement mechanisms
Source Sum of
Squares
Degrees of
Freedom
Mean
Squares
F Prob > F
(= p-value)
Image-Information 26.969 1 26.969 684.73 < 0.0001
Police Agents 168.95 5 33.7907 801.85 < 0.0001
Reputation 12.308 1 12.3078 332.01 < 0.0001
As the significant p-value suggests, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude
that the utilization of enforcement results in a difference in the average energy con-
sumption. Looking at the parameters that influenced this result the most, we see that
the success of enforcement mechanisms was significantly dependant on the population
composition (p < 0.0001) which makes our Hypotheses 2–4 correct with respect to
that parameter. Analysing Table 2 more closely, one notices that a high error rate can
be observed, indicating that a difference exists between the three enforcement mecha-
nisms that are grouped in the ANOVA. In order to examine this effect more closely, as
well as to determine the extent to which each enforcement mechanism contributes to
this difference, we perform Tukey’s test as post-hoc analysis. Fig 2 shows the results
of this analysis and Table 3 gives on overview of the respective statistical values per
enforcement mechanism.
As the p-values in Table 3 show, all mechanisms have an average energy consump-
tion significantly different to the experiments with no enforcement, however looking at
the Tukey’s test results in Fig. 2, it is clear that the results for the reputation mecha-
nism stand out. Thus, whereas the results indicate that we can confirm hypothesis 1 for
image-related information and police agents, the Tukey’s test for the reputation mecha-
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nism show that the experiments using this mechanism, have an on average higher mean
than when no enforcement is used. This implies that the utilization of reputation infor-
mation increased the average energy consumption.
Testing Hypothesis 2 Digging deeper into the differences in energy consumption, the
reason for this effect becomes apparent. As a result of the large number of additional
messages arising from the transmission of reputation information, the communication
costs are disproportionately high and thereby increase energy consumption. Thus, es-
pecially in cases with large numbers of honest agents, which would choose cooperation
even without enforcement mechanisms, the reputation requests and answers do not im-
prove enforcement, but rather result in additional energy consumption. This leads to
reputation being worse with respect to the overall energy consumption ratio even com-
pared to image information, i.e. settings where agents could only rely on their own
personal experiences.
This effect from the additional communication costs can also be seen when looking
at the ANOVA and Tukey’s test result for ρneighbourhood (Figure 4), which show that
a higher ρneighbourhood tends to result in worse energy consumption5. This can again
be attributed to the increased number of cooperation messages in these settings (with a
higher ρneighbourhood more agents receive and send messages). These additional mes-
sage costs even outweigh the benefits of being able to observe more agents (because of
the higher number of neighbours in the system). A second effect that impacted the rep-
utation mechanism was the negative information introduced by malicious agents. Our
simulation experiments were set up in such a way that if in doubt (i.e not verifiable),
reputation information was considered to be correct (i.e. information from unknown
sources was considered correct at the beginning). As a result of this, especially at the
start of each experiment, by giving negative reputation information, malicious agents
5 The p-value for this relation is 0.3052, i.e. it is not significant. Nevertheless a tendency towards
the described effect was detectable throughout the experiments.
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Fig. 4. Multiple Comparison (Tukey’s Test) Results of Neighbourhood Density Marginal Means
in Settings with Reputation Information – Post Hoc Test
were able to discourage agents from cooperating with potential rivals, which also had
the side-effect that agents could gather less image information of their own. As a con-
sequence, they were more likely to have to trust uncertain reputation information in
the following interactions, causing problems for the overall reputation mechanism. As
a result of these findings, we conclude that the reputation mechanism chosen for our
particular case study is unsuitable. The reasons for this however seem of a more gen-
eral nature, that is, they are applicable to reputation mechanisms in general and should
be considered when thinking about employing a reputation mechanisms for enforce-
ment purposes: (i) Transmission of reputation information costs, for both sender and
receiver. These communication costs might result in reduced contribution of informa-
tion, and the costs associated with it might outweigh the benefits of the system. (ii) In
our experiments false information clearly harmed the system. A reputation mechanism
therefore needs to be able to cope with false information. (iii) Most reputation mech-
anisms rely on small communities in order to function well. For space limitations, we
did not present the detailed figures, but our experiments indicate that an increase in the
population size is deleterious for the reputation mechanisms, as more messages are sent
and agents are less likely to encounter one another again soon.
Testing Hypothesis 3 A second interesting effect we can observe in Fig 2 is that an
increase in the percentage of police agents does not result in a reduction of the average
energy consumption ratio. Earlier on, in Table 3 we established that police agents can
contribute to energy consumption reduction in WMGs, however exploring further, the
value of this statement varies significantly with the percentage of police agents being
employed (this is also indicated by a relatively high sum of squares error of 985.84 for
the police agent value in Table 3). In the figure, the average mean energy consumption
for experiments with 1%, 2% and 3% police agents are lower than the one with 5%
and testing this result for significance, one finds significant evidence against the null
hypothesis that the means of the results with 1%, 2% and 3% police agents are not
smaller than the results with 5% police agents (respective p-values < 0.0001). This
implies that we have to reject the null hypothesis, which in turn means that the lower
average energy consumption values for results with 1%, 2% and 3% police agents are
not a result of chance. Comparing the number of defections in the experiments with
police agents by performing a t-test, only a slight, and not significant, advantage for
experiments with 5% police agents can be found, i.e. that in these settings police agents
only added slightly to the total energy consumption. This implies that the improved
detection of violations resulting from the larger number of police agents, is outweighed
by the additional energy they consume. In economic terms this means that the lower
percentage of police agents performs better with regard to satisficing cooperation when
considering energy consumption. In economics, satisficing refers to a decision-making
strategy that attempts to meet criteria for adequacy, rather than to identify an optimal
solution [24]. Thus, although not optimal with regard to the detection of violations
(1%, 2% and 3% police agents will detect less than 5%) the costs associated with them
(i.e. the energy they consume for performing their observation and punishing actions)
are significantly lower, making them more advantageous in terms of the overall energy
saving.
Concerning the remaining parameters addressed in hypothesis 3, we found signifi-
cant evidence that the null-hypotheses (i.e. that there is no impact on the parameters) can
be rejected both for population composition and for neighbourhood density (respective
p-values < 0.0001), while the significance levels for the size of the population varying
between (0.0154 and 0.0604) this does not allow rejection of the null-hypothesis at a
significance level of 0.01, but still indicates that there is reason to believe that popula-
tion size could have a moderate impact.
Testing Hypothesis 4 For simulations in which image information is used, as hypoth-
esized, we can reject the null hypothesis for all input parameters (i.e we have enough
evidence to assume that Hypothesis 4 is correct). Both the population composition and
the population size have a significance level p < 0.0001 and ρneighbourhood has a p-
value < 0.0005.
Summarizing the Findings Summarizing for the four hypotheses formulated in Sec. 6.1
we arrive at the following conclusions:
Hypothesis 1: Correct for police agents (between 1% and 5% of | A |) and for image
information, but incorrect for reputation information.
Hypothesis 2: Reputation information did not help to decrease the average energy con-
sumption in the WMG. Both population size and composition had a significant
impact here.
Hypothesis 3: The success of police agents is dependent on population density, com-
position and the number of police agents | AEnf |.
Hypothesis 4: Correct for all parameters.
7 Conclusions
We have compared three different enforcement mechanisms that are often employed in
open distributed systems in the context of a single case study, namely WMGs. WMGs
broadly exhibit some of the most challenging characteristics of open systems, in the
form of (potentially) rapidly changing participation and little or no authentication. Per-
haps the most contentious aspect of the measurements, in respect of generalization, is
the focus on energy consumption, since this is clearly specific to the WMG domain.
The question is to what extent can this be viewed as a proxy for the fitness of an open
system. We do not pretend that it is an accurate such indicator, but being an aggrega-
tor of interactions within the open system, and its minimization being a metric for the
effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms, it seems likely to be positively corre-
lated with overall system fitness. A second issue affecting broader applicability may be
the costs attributed to enforcement, since these are unavoidably expressed in domain-
specific terms. Nevertheless, as with the previous point, the costs are just a formula
associated with a transaction, and while changing the formula may lead to a different
preference outcome, it should not fundamentally affect the validity of the approach.
Thus, the primary and unsurprising conclusion of this comparative analysis is that
enforcement does not always help, and that the costs of enforcement need to be ac-
counted for when deciding upon an enforcement mechanism, whether intrinsic in the
form of, say communications, or extrinsic, in the form of, say rewards for observers
looking for infractions. Of the three mechanisms presented, police agents especially
seem to help to improve energy consumption. Although the results we present are in-
evitably linked to the specific mechanisms chosen, some general findings can be made.
The first is that the population composition accounts for the majority of the im-
pact by the input factors on energy consumption. Second, the costs associated with the
enforcement can outweigh the benefits. In the case of police agents this resulted in the
situation that fewer agents produced a better absolute result in terms of energy consump-
tion, while “only” satisficing the detection of violation actions. Similar effects could be
seen in experiments with reputation information, where the message overhead produced
by the reputation request and answers outweighed the benefits of the mechanism. One
further aspect that influenced the performance of our reputation information-based en-
forcement mechanism negatively, is false information. This is particularly important as
we implemented an adaptation of a mechanism that tried to account for this problem.
However it did not have sufficient interactions to have any significant effect. The mech-
anism of Abdul-Rahman and Hailes – like any reputation mechanism – works better
when the number of repeated interactions increases. Unfortunately this seems unlikely
in a WMG and in open distributes systems in general, suggesting that the designer
needs to consider – and possibly evaluate – carefully whether the characteristics of the
situation are compatible with reputation mechanisms.
With respect to future work we aim to extend the simulation experiments by em-
ploying combinations of different enforcement mechanisms. In the experiments leading
to this paper, we assumed that only one enforcement mechanism can be employed at
any given time and that the choice of mechanism is constant throughout a simulation
experiment. We plan to extend the work by relaxing this assumption and combining
different enforcement concepts in the simulation experiments. This paper established
the baseline for each mechanism in isolation.
The experiments could also be extended by employing more sophisticated agents.
We employed three kinds of agents that pursue very different strategies in order to test
how sensitive the simulation is to very one-sided behaviour (e.g. always defect or al-
ways cooperate). In an actual deployment of a WMG such a one-sided behaviour might
not be very realistic. Therefore, agents with more sophisticated reasoning processes that
exhibit more diverse responses to the successes or failures of cooperation situations are
needed. One extension could be to allow malicious agents to cooperate occasionally in
order to make them harder to detect for other agents, or to allow for variations in the
reactions to sanctions by the utility maximizing agents.
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